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Recent increases in municipal insurance premiums1 have threatened to
force some municipalities to go without liability insurance and risk bank-
ruptcy.2 In response, several state legislatures are instituting tort reform
and trying to ensure that municipalities receive adequate coverage for tort
liability.3 These plans indicate increasing recognition of the problem, but
1. See Richland, Municipal Law: Local Government Liability Insurance and Tort Reform,
N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1986, at I ("over 163 towns in New York State reported a premium increase of
up to 100%; over 41 towns reported an increase of up to 400%"); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26,
col. I (editorial) (California's Orange County experienced six-fold increase in premiums); Sawyer,
How a Good Town Became a Bad Risk, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1986, at A6, col. 6 (insurance premium
for Schaghticoke, N.Y., increased 400% in course of one year).
2. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 41, col. 2 (reporting on "indications that 'quite a few' New
Jersey municipalities can't get insurance"); Sullivan, U.S., States Seeking Ways to End Liability In-
surance Crisis, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 7, 1986, at 4, col. 3 (Blue Lake, Cal., lost its liability
insurance policy and flew flag upside down as signal of distress); Wolinsky, Insurance Crisis Forecast
for Most California Cities, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, at 3, col. 3 (estimating that two-thirds of
California cities will be forced to go without liability coverage, while 43 cities already lack coverage);
see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26, col. I (editorial) (discussing need for proposals to smooth
out effects of insurance business cycles); telephone interview with Mark Wasser, General Counsel to
California Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority (Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Wasser Interview]
(stating that joint insurance pools were formed in response to cyclical nature of commercial insurance
rates).
3. See Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.B.A. J., July, 1986, at 48, 51 (1986)
(reform of state tort systems expected in reaction to liability crisis); Priest, The Current Insurance
Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587-89 (1987) (discussing tort reform); Wash.
Post, Nov. 20, 1987, at C4, col. 1 (Virginia facing problems regarding liability insurance despite prior
legislative action); Weintraub, 9 Bills Limiting Governmental Liability Pass Key State Panels, L.A.
Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at 3, col. 2 (legislation passed to limit state and local government liability);
Pasztor, White House Switches Focus to States in Bid for Liability-Insurance Revisions, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 27, 1987, at 48, col. 2 (in 1986, "30 states adopted laws that in some way limit liability
claims"); Richland, supra note 1, at 2, col. 3 (discussing New York state proposal to amend rule of
joint and several liability, and abolish collateral-source rule in reaction to insurance crisis); Sullivan,
supra note 2, at 4, col. 1 (as of March 1986, 44 states with legislatures in session had tort reform bills
pending); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26, col. 1 (editorial) (insurers call for tort reform to limit
local government liability).
In California, a bill calling for a state insurance pool was recently passed by the state assembly.
CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 6599.01-.41 (West Supp. 1988). Under the California law, a state-instituted
liability fund, administered through the Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority ("LASIA"), provides
municipalities with insurance coverage for all tort liability over $1,000,000 and under $25,000,000 not
met by private insurers. The fund is supported by premiums paid by municipalities, membership fees,
and interest earned on money in the fund. The fund and its administration are separate from the state
government, and the state is not directly responsible for the fund or for torts committed by any munic-
ipality covered under the plan. The program's sponsor stressed that "[plublic entities are among those
most severely affected by the unavailability of liability insurance. Cities and counties are particularly
affected because of their high contact with people who use public facilities, especially streets, high-
ways, parks and beaches." D. Hauser, Liability: Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority 1 (Aug. 26,
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they do not provide a comprehensive solution to the frequent unavailabil-
ity of municipal insurance.4 This Note proposes that state legislatures as-
sume responsibility for funding municipal tort liability through their
power to levy income taxes. Adopting this proposal would help provide a
long-term solution to the effects of insurance cycles on municipalities,
while furthering the goals of the tort system.
The modern tort system rests on three principal goals: loss spreading,5
compensation,' and deterrence.7  These three principles provide bench
marks against which to measure the desirability and success of reforms in
tort law and financing tort compensation. This Note argues that state
funding through income taxation would be better at spreading losses and
providing compensation than the current system of funding municipal lia-
bility and would also assure at least an equal level of deterrence. In addi-
tion, other public policy goals, not directly related to tort law, would be
better addressed under a system of state-funded insurance.
Section I of this Note presents a general theoretical discussion of the
goals of tort law and the relationship between government liability and
loss spreading. Section II examines the elements of municipal taxation,
and argues that the prevailing system of self-insurance by municipal gov-
1986) (legislative analysis of LASIA) (on file with author).
Minnesota has instituted a system called the League of Minnesota Cities ("LMC"); like Califor-
nia's LASIA, it allows cities to insure jointly against liability. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.982 (West
Supp. 1988), Membership in the LMC grew from approximately 80 municipalities in May 1981 to
approximately 400 in October 1985. League of Minnesota Cities, at 1 (1986) (information packet
distributed by LMC) (on file with author). The 400 LMC members comprise about half of Minne-
sota's 855 municipalities. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1988, at 274 (1988).
In addition, statutory provisions in other states allow joint insurance by municipalities. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.28(14) (Harrison Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-401 (Supp. 1980); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.1-7.3:1, 15.1-21 (1950 & Supp. 1987).
New York State was recently forced to insure a tramway which runs between New York City's
Roosevelt Island and Manhattan. When operators of the tramway could not afford an insurance rate
increase from $800,000 to $9,000,000 a year, the state stepped in and self-insured the tramway ser-
vice. Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 18. In addition, New York's
attorney general has proposed the creation of a state insurance fund. The fund would charge munid-
palities the lowest possible rates to provide personal liability and property damage insurance for local
governments. The fund would cover only local governments with fewer than 125,000 residents.
Aschkenasky, Bill Offers N.Y.S. Fund for Gov't Liability, NA'L. UNDERWRITER, Feb. 14, 1986, at
4, col. 1.
4. Municipal insurance, even when it is technically available, is often unaffordable; a solution to
the insurance problem must address both availability and cost. See D. Hauser, supra note 3, at 1
(cities and counties are most affected by unavailability of insurance); telephone interview with Patrick
J. McCormick, Legislative Analyst for Minnesota Senate (Dec. 1, 1987) (legislation for joint self-
insurance pools for cities grew out of concern about recurring lack of insurance coverage).
5. The goal of loss spreading is satisfied when the cost of an accident is not borne solely by the
tortfeasor. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-45 (1970); see also infra note 11.
6. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 44; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984); Stewart, Crisis in
Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 184 (1987) (compensation is function of
tort law).
7. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 26-31, 68-69; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEE-
TON & D. OWEN, supra note 6, § 4, at 25-26 (providing strong incentive to prevent harm is one
reason for imposing liability).
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ernments is regressive.' Therefore, the current system fails to spread losses
proportionately. Section III outlines a state-funded system and proposes
specific measures for its implementation. Section III also demonstrates
how a system of state funding would avoid the regressive effects of munic-
ipal funding, while preserving adequate levels of deterrence and compen-
sation. Section IV discusses other advantages and possible disadvantages of
the proposal.
I. TORT LAW AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
A. Principles of Tort Law
Three primary goals of modern tort law are compensation, deterrence,
and loss spreading.' Compensation, which focuses on the system's
"payouts," is measured by the degree to which the victim is restored to the
condition she was in before the tort occurred. Deterrence, which forces
tortfeasors to absorb the cost of their harms, is measured by the extent to
which a system discourages people from engaging in harmful activities.1"
Loss spreading focuses on "pay-ins" to the tort system.11
Loss spreading requires that individuals in society share the costs of
accidents because society is better off if several members of society suffer
small losses than if one member suffers a large loss."2 Therefore, the no-
tion of loss spreading is premised on the idea that accident costs should be
as evenly dispersed throughout society as possible.
8. A tax is regressive if lower-income individuals pay a larger proportion of their income in taxes
than those with higher incomes. Under a progressive tax system, those with higher incomes bear a
greater proportion of the tax burden. A progressive system of taxation conforms to the notion that tax
rates should correlate with one's ability to pay. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE
AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 298-300 (1983); W. GARDNER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: NATIONAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL 51-52 (1978).
9. See supra notes 5-7. Some scholars elevate corrective justice to the level of a principle of tort
law, or a constraint on the pursuit of other goals. See, e.g., Coleman, CorrectiveJustice and Wrongful
Gain, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982). Even if corrective justice is a legitimate goal, it is addressed
inadequately by the existing tort system. See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 555 (1985). Sugarman argues that the goal of corrective justice is ill-served by the fault system
in three ways: (1) liability insurance and the rule of respondeat superior undercut the notion of
corrective justice against an individual defendant; (2) victims frequently obtain funds for rehabilitation
from other sources before suing; and (3) it is not a given that people really want the legal system to
provide retribution for harms or think it capable of doing so. Id. at 603-04.
10. Deterrence can be accomplished in two ways: (1) "direct deterrence," through rules that help
prevent accidents (regulation); and (2) "market deterrence," the forced internalization of the costs of
accident-causing behavior (paying damages). Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 667, 669 (1985); see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 68, 69 (direct deterrence
called "specific deterrence"; market deterrence called "general deterrence"). Incorporated in the idea
of deterrence is the concept of fault-assigning punishment based on the quality of the injurer's dam-
aging conduct. Finding fault and assessing damages are functions of tort law, rather than goals. Cf.
Owen, supra, at 665, 666 (stigmatizing particular behavior and assessing damages are functions of
tort law).
11. Even if one does not accept loss spreading as a free-standing goal of tort law, it has become a
major factor in the tort system because insurance is prevalent in our society. James, Accident Liability
Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 551 (1948) (widely held insur-
ance means that tort liability is no longer shifted, but is distributed).
12. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 39.
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B. Government Liability and Loss Spreading
In exploring the relationship between government liability13 and loss
spreading, it is helpful to examine the historical connection between the
two concepts. Beginning in the thirteenth century, English law held the
sovereign immune based on the belief that the king could do no wrong.1 4
In America, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was adopted because it
was believed that suits against the government would hamper it from per-
forming its public duty and would deplete public funds.1" Thus, the fact
that government liability is funded through taxation, unlike private liabil-
ity, contributed to the adoption of sovereign immunity in America. Al-
though sovereign immunity has been criticized since its entrenchment in
American common law, the doctrine survived into the 1960's." The de-
bate shifted in favor of increased government liability after Fleming
James introduced the concept of loss spreading. Indeed, loss spreading
has been the primary reason given by contemporary scholars" and
courts for abolishing sovereign immunity.
13. The proposed system of state funding applies only to state common law and statutory tort
claims. It does not apply to actions under the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes. The proposal is
limited to claims based on state law for two reasons: (1) this Note does not address the values associ-
ated with constitutional law and how those values relate to, or supersede, the economic goals of the
tort system; and (2) municipal liability arises primarily out of accidents related to common law torts.
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
Because state common law and statutory claims must be treated separately from constitutional and
federal statutory claims, this proposal would require that the compensation fund cover damages only
for state claims. Municipalities would continue to pay damages for violations of federal law.
14. Birmingham, Sovereign Immunity in Connecticut: Survey and Economic Analysis, 13 CONN.
L. REV. 293, 293-94 (1981); see also 18 E. MCQUILLIN & S. FLANAGAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987) (principle of sovereign immunity appears to
have derived from English concept that 'king could do no wrong').
15. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 n.28 (1980); Birmingham, supra note 14,
at 295.
16. Birmingham, supra note 14, at 293-95.
17. See James, supra note 11; see also Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1082 (1972) (rise of "currently dominant distributional goals" of loss
spreading and distribution in favor of victims is connected to increased compensation).
18. 3 K. DAVIS, AnMINISrRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.17, at 503 (1958) (government should be
held liable more often than private actors because of government's superior ability to spread losses); P.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 101 (1983) (one justification for expanding governmental liability is
increased loss spreading); see also Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospec-
tus, 10 UCLA L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1963); cf. E. MCQUILLIN & S. FLANAGAN, supra note 14, §
53.02, at 153 (sovereign immunity criticized by scholars because economic burden borne by individ-
ual). Van Alstyne draws upon the general shift to a risk-spreading rationale in tort law to ground his
argument that governments should be held liable for torts. This rationale follows, in turn, from the
goals of loss spreading and victim compensation. See James, supra note 11, at 557-58. James, in
keeping with his general belief that loss spreading should be a principal goal of tort law, asserts that
any rule that extends loss spreading should be adopted unless it increases the accident rate. Harper,
James and Gray review systems of general social insurance for tort based on loss spreading, but do
not recommend a framework for the implementation of any particular program. 3 F. HARPER, F.
JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS §13.1 (2d ed. 1986). Indeed, all of the commentators cited
supra discuss government assumption of liability only from a national/theoretical perspective.
19. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The court in Owen held that munici-
palities have no immunity from constitutional violations. In its opinion, the court pointed out that
"[n]o longer is 'blameworthiness' the acid test of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has
joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct." Id. at 657; cf. E. MCQUILLIN
Municipal Tort Liability
As some of the protections of sovereign immunity have lapsed, munici-
palities have found themselves exposed to tort claims, principally those
arising out of the activities that they perform as a matter of custom. These
activities include dispatching police patrol cars, running subway systems,
lighting city streets, maintaining city parks, and supervising swimming
pools.2°
II. MUNICIPAL TAXATION
The current system of funding municipal liability is inadequate because
its reliance on a regressive taxation system lays a disproportionate burden
for tort compensation on those less well-off. In other words, the system
relies on regressive taxation and therefore compromises loss spreading.
The less regressive the form of taxation used to fund municipal tort liabil-
ity, the more proportionately2' losses are spread throughout society. A
shift to non-regressive funding would further loss spreading by assuring
that the costs of victim compensation are distributed more proportionately
throughout society.22
Taxation provides municipalities with the funds to cover liability insur-
ance premiums and adverse damage awards. While taxation is not the
only source of revenue for municipalities, other sources, such as intergov-
ernmental revenues or bonds, are earmarked for specific uses and are not
generally available for funding tort liability.2" In 1985, forty-nine percent
& S. FLANAGAN, supra note 14, § 53.02, at 153 (sovereign immunity condemned by jurists because
economic consequences borne by individuals).
20. New York City breaks its liability claims into nine major types: defective roadways, defective
sidewalks, police action, accidents occurring on school property, medical malpractice, auto accidents,
claims by employees, recreation, and accidents occurring on public property. In fiscal year 1986-1987,
the major claims types made up 95% of the total personal injury claims filed against the city. New
York City Office of Management and Budget, Statistical Compilation of Claims Against New York
City (1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter OMB Study]; see also Mashaw, Civil Liability of Gov-
ernment Officers: Property Rights and Official Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1978, at 13-14 (proprietary acts induce most government civil liability); Sandoz, Safety: The Watch-
word for the Eighties, 9 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 443 (1982-83) (discussing dangers from gas lines,
police, and vehicles); Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled, supra note 3 (listing types of activities that
contribute to insurance crisis); D. Hauser, supra note 3, at 1 (cities and counties have high contact
with people using streets, highways, parks, and beaches).
21. Calabresi argues that the "deep pocket" approach to loss spreading (putting heavier burdens
on the wealthy) is better at reducing the secondary costs of accidents (i.e., economic dislocation). G.
CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 42. The proposal in this Note is only concerned with removing the
disproportionality (regressiveness) of the funding system. The degree to which the income tax used to
fund the proposal should conform to the "deep pocket" model or the proportionality model is a deci-
sion best made by state legislatures.
22. The "payouts" of the tort system do not affect loss spreading. Even if low-income persons
gain less from the tort compensation system than do those more well-off, a shift to non-regressive
taxation would still increase loss spreading because the losses would be spread more proportionately
among individuals and municipalities. See id. at 41 (compensation for loss of income favors those more
well-off); Priest, supra note 3, at 1552 (poor have low current and prospective incomes and, therefore,
tend to recover low damages). This Note focuses on the financing (pay-in) of the tort system, and does
not address the configuration of compensation (payout) or the overall equity of the tort system.
23. Federal aid to state and local governments is largely limited to specific projects in the follow-
ing categories: waste treatment, compensatory education, Medicaid, Social Security, low-income hous-
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of municipal tax revenues were raised through property taxation,"
twenty-nine percent through sales taxation,2 5 fourteen percent through in-
come taxation, 6 and eight percent through other forms of taxation.2"
Overall, municipal taxation is regressive.23
A. Property Taxes
Property taxation29 is regressive to the extent that it is passed on to
renters."0 Although property taxes are paid by property owners, some
portion of the tax burden is assumed by renters. 1 Whether as a result of
ing, and transportation. See BUtEAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1986, at 269 (1986).
24. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CITY GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1985-1986, at 1 (1986) [herein-
after Cr GOVERNMENT FINANCES].
25. Id.
26. Id. In 1984, only 11 states had municipalities which levied income taxes. In most states only
the larger cities (e.g., New York City) did so. See id. at 7-64. In comparison, 46 states levied income
taxes (either personal or corporate, or both). BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE GOVERNMENT FI-
NANCES IN 1985-86, at 11 (1986) [hereinafter STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES].
The four states that do not currently tax income would undergo a substantial change in their tax
structures if they were to adopt this proposal. However, this Note provides those states with a guide
for considering adoption of the state-funded plan described here and gives state legislatures substantial
flexibility to choose the system best suited to their own state.
27. Cr GOVERNMENT FINANCES, supra note 24, at 1.
28. In a study based on 1976 data for all 50 states, Donald Phares analyzed tax incidence (equity)
by examining taxation under progressive, regressive, and mainstream assumptions. D. PHARE, WHO
PAYS STATE AND LOCAL PROPERTY TAXES? 29-30 (1980). With respect to property taxes-a focal
point of the incidence debate-the mainstream assumption lies between the most progressive view of
property taxation (property taxes fall on owners of capital) and the most regressive view (property
taxes are passed on to renters). The mainstream assumption apportions half the tax to owners of
capital and the other half to renters. The mainstream position presents a balanced view of tax inci-
dence and will therefore constitute the basis for presenting Phares' data in this Note. Under the
mainstream view, Phares demonstrated that for those earning less than $3,000, the overall average
effective rate of all local taxation was 12.88%, while those who earned more than $35,000 paid a rate
of only 3.95%. There was a decrease in the overall rate in direct relation to the increase in income
across the income levels. Id. at 90-91. In a 1974 study, Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld evalu-
ated the overall spending and tax equities of local, state, and federal governments. Their study shows
that local taxation was regressive. In contrast, state taxes were proportional. Federal government taxa-
tion was slightly progressive. Inman & Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1692-94 (1979). On the basis of their study, Inman and Rubinfeld concluded
that only programs based on income redistribution and centralized financing would result in tax and
spending equity. Id. at 1748-49.
29. Property taxes have been the mainstay of municipal taxation principally because they can be
levied without the consent of the state government, unlike income and sales taxes. W. GARDNER,
supra note 8, at 361. There are at least two reasons why state governments might be reluctant to give
municipalities the right to raise sales or income taxes: (1) municipalities with high income flow, but
low assessed property values, are better served by the ability to raise sales or income taxes than are
poor municipalities; and (2) municipal government sales or income taxes might conflict with existing
state sales or income taxes. See supra note 26 (in 11 states where local income taxes are levied, they
are collected only by large cities).
Another comparative advantage is that the property tax base is relatively immobile. Since land and
buildings cannot be shifted in the event of tax increases, rental values (or property values) will re-
spond relatively slowly to changes in property taxes. W. HIRSCH, THE ECONOMICS OF STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 95-96 (1970).
30. W. GARDNER, supra note 8, at 395-96 (extent of income-distribution effects depends on por-
tion of income low-income families spend on housing).
31. R. BOADWAY & D. WILDASIN, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMIcS 437-39 (2d ed. 1979) (due to
relative inelasticity of demand for housing, tax burden may be shifted forward to consumers); E.
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rent-passing or other factors, the burden of property taxation falls dispro-
portionately upon those in the lower income brackets. 2
B. Sales Taxes
Sales taxes are paid by retailers and passed on to consumers through
surcharges on purchased goods. Since individuals with lower incomes
spend a higher proportion of their disposable income on consumption
goods, and thus on sales taxes, sales taxation is regressive."
C. Income Taxes
Income taxes affix a marginal tax rate to a given level of earnings.
Under an income tax, those with a higher income bear a heavier tax bur-
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 8, at 404 (property tax regressive at local level).
32. Although there is some debate about the degree to which property taxes are passed on to
renters or property assessments are skewed to favor those more well-off, empirical results reveal the
general regressivity of property taxation. In 1976, persons earning under $3,000 paid an effective tax
rate of 10.25% on local property taxes, while those making over $35,000 paid a rate of only 2.79%.
The decline in rates from 10.25% to 2.79% was steady and inversely related to the level of income. D.
PHARES, supra note 28, at 90-91.
A more recent study conducted by Phares on New York state and city taxes demonstrates the
regressive nature of property taxation in particular and local taxation in general. The overall local
property tax rate averaged 20.5% for individuals making under $4,200 and declined steadily to a rate
of 3.37% for those in the $42,000-49,000 range, with a slight increase to 4.62% for those making over
$49,000. D. Phares, Who Pays New York Taxes? 90-91 (Aug. 16, 1985) [hereinafter New York
Study] (working paper prepared by staff of New York Legislative Commission on Modernization and
Simplification of Tax Administration and Tax Law).
Using 1980 data, Phares also demonstrated that property taxation in Hawaii was regressive. In his
study, the effective rate for those earning between $3,900 and $5,199 was 2.36%. As incomes in-
creased, this rate fell constantly to a low of 0.66% at the $32,500-38,999 level. The effective rate was
higher (3.65%) for those with income over $100,000. D. Phares, The Impact of Hawaii's Taxes: A
Look at Taxpayer Burden and Equity, at 86 (December 1984) [hereinafter Hawaii Study] (final
report available from Hawaii Tax Review Commission).
In a study of Indiana state and local taxes, James Papke's results show that, assuming no shift in
the tax burden onto consumers, property taxation in Indiana has been regressive. In 1985, the average
effective tax rate for someone earning $3,001-5,000 was 5.87%. The rate for those earning more than
5100,000 was only 3.53%, with the lowest rate (2.75%) assessed against those making $40,001-50,000.
J. PAPKE, THE COMPOSITION AND BURDEN OF INDIANA'S TAX SYSTEM; INTERSTATE COMPARI-
SONS 41 (1987) (report prepared for the Indiana State Teachers Association).
33. In 1976, the average effective tax rate for local sales taxation on individuals with an income
under $3,000 was 1.07%. This percentage fell as income increased, reaching a low of 0.30% for those
with an income of over $35,000. D. PHARES, supra note 28, at 90-91.
Phares' New York study yielded similar results. The effective local sales and use tax rate for those
earning under $4,200 was 2.7%, and the percentage declined steadily to a rate of 0.9% for those
earning over $49,000. New York Study, supra note 32, at 85.
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den than those with a lower income."' Consequently, income taxation is
non-regressive.35
In addition, taxpayers prefer income taxes to property taxes. In a sur-
vey of citizens' attitudes toward various taxation regimes, local property
taxation was consistently seen as the least desirable form of taxation,
while state income taxation was viewed as the least objectionable.36
D. Implications of Tax Analysis
The regressive nature of most municipal taxation undercuts the goal of
spreading losses. This observation motivates the search for a way to
achieve greater loss spreading without detracting from existing levels of
deterrence and compensation.
To attack the problem, municipalities could raise non-regressive taxes.
However, this approach suffers several defects. Inequities in wealth
among municipalities within a state cannot be addressed by non-regressive
taxation within a single municipality. Similarly, some municipalities will
not be able to fund adverse judgments through income taxation unless
they levy extremely high taxes, which may increase the overall regressivity
within the system. Finally, municipalities cannot raise or increase their
34. In 1976, individuals who earned under $3,000 paid an average effective rate of 0.01% in state
income taxes. This rate increased steadily, reaching a high of 1.96% for those earning between
$30,000 and $35,000. There was a difference of more than 190-fold between the lowest and highest
average effective tax rate paid. D. PHARES, supra note 28, at 90-91.
New York state income taxes for 1980 showed similar progressivity. For individuals earning
$4,200-5,999, the effective tax rate was 0.86%. This rate increased with income, reaching 3.6% for
those earning $35,000-41,999. New York Study, supra note 32, at 71.
The Hawaii study showed that state income taxes were progressive, but not as markedly as the first
two studies might suggest. The effective tax rate for those earning below $3,900 was 1.5%. The rate
increased to 3.6% for those making between $9,100 and $10,399. There was a decrease in the rate for
those earning between $10,400 and $38,000, with a minimum rate of 1.4%. Nevertheless, the rate
increased for those earning more than $39,000, with the highest rate, 3.7%, levied against those earn-
ing more than $100,000. Hawaii Study, supra note 32, at 85.
Papke found that in 1985, the effective Indiana personal income tax rate progressed steadily from -
2.25% to 1.7% over an income range from 30-25,000. For those with higher incomes, the rate fluctu-
ated but generally remained higher than the rate assessed against those with the lowest incomes. J.
PAPRE, supra note 32, at 41.
Recent increases in taxable income, due to the elimination of many federal tax loopholes, have led
to greater progressivity in state income taxation. Murray, Many States Target Wealthy to Bear Tax
Burden As New U.S. Law Forces Them to Revamp Codes, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 50, col. 1.
35. However, a flat-rate tax without exemptions may be regressive. Those with lower incomes
may not be as adept at minimizing their taxable income.
36. In a 1982 survey conducted throughout the continental United States, 1,000 adults were asked
which form of taxation they felt was the least fair: federal income taxes, state income taxes, state sales
taxes, local property taxes, and "do not know." Of the five choices, local property taxes were seen as
the worst form of taxation by 30% of the sample group, while state income taxes were seen as the
most equitable form, with only 11% labelling them as the worst. This pattern was consistent with
attitudes expressed during the preceding decade. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, CHANGING PUBLIC ArrITUnES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 13 (1982). The distaste
for local property taxation has been suggested as one reason for the shift in educational funding and
control from local to state governments. J. HARRIGAN, POLITICS AND POLICY IN STATES AND COM-
MUNITIES 265 (1980).
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proportional share of income taxes without permission from the state
legislature."7
III. A PROPOSAL FOR STATE-FUNDED MUNICIPAL TORT INSURANCE
State funding of municipal liability would capitalize on the advantages
states have in spreading losses. States are in a better position to spread
losses than municipalities for two reasons. First, states have a larger base
from which they can draw income tax revenues to fund the system. Sec-
ond, state funding would facilitate loss spreading from richer municipali-
ties, which generate greater income taxes, to poorer municipalities, which
generate less; state funding thus would help ensure non-regessivity.3 ' A
national system would be preferable if the sole purpose of the program
were loss spreading. However, another essential component of the pro-
gram is deterrence of undesirable behavior through regulatory measures.
Since states are closer to municipalities both geographically and institu-
tionally, state governments are in a better position than the federal gov-
ernment to regulate municipal activities.3 ' This proposal presents several
options for state legislatures to consider in shaping a response tailored to
local needs and preferences. These options include reliance on a tort or
compensation system,40 fines and compulsory directives, inspections, and
37. See 4 C. SANDS & M. LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 23.01 (1982 & Supp. 1987)
("[A]bsent a constitutional provision governing the matter, the state legislature is regarded as having a
sovereign's free hand in determining the proper allocation of taxing competence between and among
the state itself and local government units."); cf infra note 48 (discussing power of states over
municipalities).
38. Courts have already taken notice of the disparity in wealth among municipalities and the
relationship of this disparity to local financing. Although these cases involve education, rather than
municipal liability, they illuminate the legal import of the manner in which local property taxation
exacerbates inequities among municipalities.
In 1973, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey's system of financing education
through property taxation violated the state constitution. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273 (1973). The court ruled in Cahill that financing public education through property taxes unfairly
advantaged wealthier municipalities. The court ordered the implementation of a new system of financ-
ing, but left to the legislature the details of its formulation. Several proposals were presented to the
court and turned down for failure to meet the New Jersey constitutional standard that there be "'a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the
State. . . .'" Id. at 285. Finally, the legislature was forced to impose an income tax, the state's first,
to meet the standard set by the court. R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 161-63 (1978).
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the
use of property taxation to finance public education did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause under the "rational basis" test. Id. at 55. Nevertheless, the Court did recog-
nize the need for tax reform in the funding system, although it felt that such a reorganization could be
accomplished only through legislative action. Id. at 50-59.
39. The long history of direct interaction (through funding and regulation) between states and
municipalities is evident in education, transportation, and land use. See J. HARRIGAN, supra note 36,
at 251-72, 295-317, 319-41; see also infra note 48 (describing legal authority of states over
municipalities).
40. Under a state-funded system, compensation could be distributed either through a no-fault
system, whereby victims are compensated according to a payout schedule, or through the existing
fault-based tort system. See generally Sugarman, supra note 9 (argument for no-fault system). Al-
though the general merits of a no-fault system versus a fault system are the subject of ongoing debate,
id., a no-fault system seems particularly well-suited for a state-funded municipal insurance program.
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safety education programs. Each state faces a unique set of conditions pro-
duced by the combination of its political environment, tax structure, and
fiscal health. This proposal attempts to provide state legislatures with a
flexible implementation scheme because the best outcome will be achieved
only if states rely to a certain degree on each of the several policy vari-
ables. The optimal degree of reliance on each policy variable will be a
matter for individual state legislatures to determine.
A no-fault system encompasses a collectivist view of torts, which seems appropriate in the context of
communities causing harm to their citizens. Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 755,
756 (1985) (no-fault system embraces more collectivist view of compensation than fault system). In
addition, one of the principal rationales for having a fault system-deterrence-is not applicable to
the proposed program, since deterrence would be achieved through means other than court-awarded
damages. See supra Section III (B).
A no-fault system would eliminate many of the transaction costs associated with a court-based tort
system: It would involve less reliance on lawyers, and decrease expenditures on litigation. See
Sugarman, supra note 9, at 598. Sugarman points out that the administrative costs of the tort system
are so high that only half of all liability insurance actually goes to the victim. Id. at 596. Sugarman
also describes the cost to the public of judges and the court system. Id.; see also Pierce, Encouraging
Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1323 (1983)
(compensation system reduces transaction costs by eliminating certain factual disputes relating to cau-
sation). The no-fault mechanism would have the added benefit of making compensation readily avail-
able to all victims, since there would be fewer legal obstacles to payment. The guarantee of compensa-
tion would mean an effective end to the "lottery" system of compensation currently embodied in the
tort system. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement,
53 VA. L. REv. 774, 778-80 (1967) (likening fault system of compensation to lottery); Pierce, supra,
at 1321-22 (move to compensation system eliminates lottery component of fault system). This guaran-
tee would widen the distribution of compensation.
In addition, the current tort systerd awards people with low income less compensation on average
than people with higher income because damage awards often include lost earnings and pain and
suffering; the payout on these damage components is generally greater for those with higher income.
Priest, supra note 3, at 1558-59; Stewart, supra note 6, at 188.
There are advantages to shifting the mode of cost internalization from courts to agencies. Regula-
tory agencies provide more accurate information for constructing experience ratings. Henderson,Judi-
cial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 1531 (1973) (courts not well suited for role of setting safety standards in general, and manufac-
turers' safety standards in particular); Pierce, supra, at 1322-23; see infra Section III(B)(2) (propos-
ing use of experience rating to assess fines and target inspections). All accident data relating to munic-
ipalities would be funneled through an agency; this procedure would yield more accurate risk
assessments than courts could provide. In addition to better data, the proposed regulatory system
would allow immediate cost calculation, based on compensation payments and causation analyses,
without resort to the judicial system. Pierce, supra, at 1326. Regulatory agencies can use aggregate
data to analyze statistical and probabilistic causation. Id. at 1310. By contrast, much of the evidence
presented in a judicial proceeding must be specific to the parties before the court. See G. CALABRESl,
supra note 5, at 256 (fault system likely to ignore recurring cost avoider since it focuses only on
particular cost avoider). While an administrative compensation system would not eliminate the need to
find some causal relationship between municipal conduct and an injury, proving causation would be
much less difficult in an administrative proceeding. Cf Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause:
Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Concept of Causation, 31 TEx. L. REv. 630, 654-56 (1953) (difficulty
with causation standard in tort is remedied in workers' compensation system).
Another drawback to employing the tort system as a means of cost internalization is the fact that
many victims do not choose for one reason or another to go forward with a lawsuit. If they do initiate
a lawsuit, they frequently settle for compensation or find it difficult to prove fault. Calabresi points
out that the fault system fails to provide deterrence to the extent that the party at fault does not
ultimately bear the full cost of an accident. G. CAABR.SI, supra note 5, at 250; see also Shavell, A
Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271, 273 (1984)
(using mathematical model to demonstrate that low probability of suit for harm leads to sub-optimal
risk reduction).
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A. Financing
Taxes and fines are the two sources of financing explored in this propo-
sal. State income taxes would be the primary source of funding for munic-
ipal tort liability insurance because they are non-regressive.41 This system
would be based on personal income taxation, rather than pro-rata fund-
ing42 from municipalities.4
Another potential source of financing is the imposition of fines for un-
desirable behavior. In extreme circumstances, municipalities would pay
fines directly to the state. Legislatures should keep in mind that munici-
palities would discharge fines by resorting to revenue raised through re-
gressive forms of municipal taxation.4 5 Therefore, fines should be only a
minor source of revenue for a state-funded compensation system.46 Fines
should be imposed not to raise revenues, but rather to deter municipalities
from engaging in harmful behavior.
B. Regulatory Scheme
A system based on state funding of municipal tort damages would pro-
vide an excellent opportunity to utilize the efficiencies47 of state regulatory
authority over localities.48 The system should be designed to deal effec-
41. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. The method of insuring is optional. The state
could either self-insure or purchase insurance commercially. This flexibility would allow the state to
capitalize on low insurance rates when available, while retaining the option to self-insure during
times of high premiums and low availability.
42. A pro-rata system would provide financing by collecting funds from individual municipalities
according to some standard, e.g., population. A pro-rata system would not resolve the problem of
regressive funding, since funds appropriated from municipalities are typically derived from regressive
sources. See supra Section II.
43. A contemporary parallel to the plan proposed in this Note is the scheme of social insurance
for accidental harms established by New Zealand. Accident Compensation Act, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409
(1975). The New Zealand plan bars all causes of action for death or personal injury caused by
accidents and mandates a no-fault system of state-administered compensation. Henderson, The New
Zealand Accident Compensation Reform (Book Review), 48 U. CHI. L. Rav. 781, 781 (1981) (re-
viewing G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY (1979)). Variable levies are assessed on em-
ployers and flat rates on the self-employed; variable levies are imposed on motor vehicles for the motor
vehicle compensation system; and parliamentary appropriations compensate non-wage earners. Id. at
783. Under the New Zealand plan, the estimated necessary funds for the upcoming year are collected
and set aside for funding future claims. The amount is calculated by estimating the value of future
accident claims discounted by their present value. Id. at 786. The term commonly used for this form
of funding is "full funding." See T. IsoN, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 134 (1980).
44. See infra Section III(B)(2).
45. See supra Section II (describing overall regressivity of municipal taxation).
46. The amount of the insurance fund composed of fines should be limited to a specified portion
of the fund. However, the determination of the fine cap should be made by legislatures, which pre-
sumably have the relevant information concerning their individual state's needs. Factors relevant to
such a decision would be the health of the state government budget, the relative financial condition of
municipalities, and the history of state aid to local governments.
47. See infra note 76.
48. Municipalities are creatures of the states. Therefore, states have plenary power over their
municipalities, including the powers to regulate and to levy fines. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984) (municipality derives all authority from
state) (citing City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (state regulation levying fee
for diversion of waters from stream did not violate contract clause of United States Constitution since
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tively with the relationship between the municipal governmental structure
and tortious behavior.49
An agency should be established by the legislature through an enabling
statute that sets forth the agency's mandate to implement the state's regu-
latory policy.50 The formation of an agency would allow the legislature to
devise the general regulatory framework without exposing itself to interest
group pressure regarding the regulatory details.51 The agency itself may
become subject to special interest pressures. However, this problem could
be controlled by taking measures to prevent agency capture.5 The regula-
tory-insurance system proposed in this Note would shift the method of
deterrence from a purely market deterrence approach to a combined mar-
ket/direct deterrence system.3 It would consist of three components: (1)
states have plenary power to regulate municipalities)); see also P. SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 119
(states are ultimate sources of authority and have power over individual state officials and local gov-
ernments). Municipalities which would benefit from the state assuming tort funding are unlikely to
resist the increased regulation that would accompany funding. The education cases provide ample
precedent for a shift of regulatory authority from municipal government to states. See supra note 38.
The shift in responsibility for funding education from the local to the state level was accompanied by
a corresponding increase in the level of state regulation of local education. While state education
agencies ("SEAs") historically exercised little control over local school districts, the emergence of
higher levels of state funding has led SEAs to play an increasingly important policy-making role. This
regulation has taken the form of minimum competency tests for students, skill tests for teachers, and
curriculum requirements, all of which require some form of monitoring by the state. J. HARRIGAN,
supra note 36, at 254, 269-70.
49. As discussed earlier, most municipal torts occur in the course of proprietary functions. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text. In municipal governments, policy is formulated by elected
officials and implemented by low-level employees-for example, swimming pool attendants, park
rangers, and janitors. See Olson, Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs., Winter 1978, at 67, (distinguishing governmental decision from implementation by
low-level officials). Because it is difficult to monitor or regulate directly the actions of low-level em-
ployees, this proposal emphasizes the implementation of safety policies. However, legislatures would
retain the flexibility to concentrate on regulating either the decision-making unit or the low-level
employee.
50. Agency implementation is a common framework for administering regulatory compensation or
joint insurance systems. In New Zealand, regulatory authority is vested in the Accident Compensation
Commission ("ACC"). Accident Compensation Act of 1972, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409 (1975). While the
ACC plays a role in providing education and setting broad regulatory guidelines, its regulatory func-
tion is augmented by Labour Department inspectors. T. ISON, supra note 43, at 159. The LASIA
board, see supra note 3, similarly has authority to "[dievelop, promulgate, and effectuate loss preven-
tion programs, risk management programs, and safety programs." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6599.09(a)
(West Supp. 1988). It is not enough that safety regulations be passed: They must be supplemented by
enforcement, safety education, and safety research on the state level. See Sands, Hon Effectwe is Safety
Legislation?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 165, 178-79 (1968) (comprehensive state safety regulation of con-
struction industry is insufficient without scientific research and cost studies).
51. See Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAIaF. L. REv. 917, 932-33 (1985)
(legislature can shield itself from pressures by enacting broad policy and empowering agency to for-
mulate specific regulation). This structure would give the agency freedom to promulgate and enforce
specific regulatory measures, following the broad guidelines of the legislature, while remaining
shielded from political pressure. California's LASIA, described supra note 3, has broad discretionary
authority over risk management-a structure analogous to that suggested by this Note. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 6599.09(a) (West Supp. 1988).
52. Proper employment screening would eliminate the problem of the agency acting as a feeder to
special interest organizations and vide versa.
53. See Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 976, 979 (1985) (deterrence goal can be met by means other than tort liability); Shavell, On
Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120, 121-22 (1982) (terms and incentives contained in
insurance policies can lead to desired level of deterrence).
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state-promulgated safety standards for municipalities;" (2) fines and in-
junctions levied against municipalities that consistently violate state safety
standards or cause a disproportionate number of accidents;55 and (3)
safety education programs directed at low-level municipal employees.56
This tripartite system has the potential both to maintain the present level
of deterrence and to increase deterrence through more precise regulation,
cost internalization, and accident prevention.
57
1. Regulation
Under the proposed regulatory system, the state agency would promul-
gate regulations requiring municipalities to meet specified minimum stan-
dards. The standards would include safety precautions for public parks,
placement of street signs, road maintenance (filling potholes and clearing
snow), and limits on the number of people allowed in a public swimming
pool area.5 These types of regulations would help ensure that municipali-
54. The regulatory scheme could be similar to California's LASIA, described supra note 3. LA-
SIA possesses the authority to implement a system of risk management standards and safety programs
similar to those used by commercial insurers. Wasser Interview, supra note 2. The idea that risk
management experts can evaluate municipal safety programs is not new and would be a part of
almost every municipal structure if the costs were not prohibitive. See Pribble, Small Cities: Home-
made Remedies for High Insurance Rates, 13 CURRENT MUN. PROBs. 364, 367 (1986). Neverthe-
less, a system of effective deterrence would probably require on-site inspection as well.
55. Primary emphasis in setting fines should be placed on the number and severity of regulatory
violations, and not on the actual amount of damage awards, if a court-based system is used. Damage
awards are subject to jury bias and do not always reflect the extent of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, some
legislatures may prefer, or find it necessary, to fine municipalities that have high damage awards
assessed against them.
56. See 1 REVIEW BY OFFICIALS COMMIrTEE OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SCHEME 114
(1986) [hereinafter ACCIDENT REPORT] (ACC's responsibilities include "creating an interest in safety
and accident prevention").
57. G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 274-77 (optimal system composed of market and regulatory
methods); see also Shavell, supra note 40. Shavell provides a mathematical model which demonstrates
the shortcomings of a system that relies solely upon liability or regulation. Shavell demonstrates that a
system that encompasses both liability (cost internalization) and regulation is superior in achieving the
optimal level of risk reduction.
Whenever damages are not paid by the tortfeasor, but by some third party, there is a danger of
"moral hazard"-the possibility that the tortfeasor will take less care to avoid accidents. See id. at
271, 273-74 (regulatory standard is suboptimal to extent that it deviates from mean (average) optimal
amount of care); Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and
Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 202 (1977). The possibility of "moral hazard" under the
system proposed by this Note is no greater than it is under the current regime, in which insurance
predominates. See C. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION 35 (1985) (while incentive
to avoid losses is transferred to insurer, control over losses remains with insured). But see James,
supra note 11, at 559 (attacking notion that protection given by insurance undercuts deterrence).
Some of the steps proposed in this Note to control undesirable behavior are similar to the methods
used by insurance companies to curtail "moral hazard." C. HEIMER, supra, at 37, 43 (insurance
pricing, contracting, and inspection are used in insurance industry as means of controlling moral
hazard). These insurance industry policies, which are augmented by research regarding safety and
risk, have actually led to increased safety. James, supra note 11, at 559-63; see also Note, Encourag-
ing Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96
YALE L.J. 403, 406-07 (1986) (insurers have advantage in analyzing accident-related and safety-
related data).
58. See Insurance, 13 CURRENT MUN. PRoBs. 67, 71 (1985) (new loss prevention plan in Al-
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ties, which would no longer absorb the direct costs of tort liability, would
not cause an excessive number of accidents."'
2. Cost Internalization
In cases of extreme malfeasance on the part of a municipality, such as
the continuous violation of regulations or intentional misconduct, the state
agency should levy fines,60 or impose restrictions against the municipality
through administrative orders.61 Administrative restrictions could range
from closing a pool system until proper risk control measures are em-
ployed to cordoning off a hazardous city street until it is made safe." The
threat of state-imposed sanctions (fines and restrictions) would enhance
deterrence.6"
bion, Iowa, includes "scheduled checks on playground equipment and traffic signs, along with secur-
ing city equipment and tools"); Sandoz, supra note 19, 444-46 (proposed rules regulating natural gas
lines include using polyethylene materials for pipe, maintaining records on leaks, and shutting down
system to make repairs).
59. A look at the nine major claim types against New York City demonstrates that safety mea-
sures related to the provision of basic services could dramatically reduce accidents. In 1987, defective
roads and sidewalks, accidents on school property, auto accidents, park-related accidents, and acci-
dents on public property accounted for $56,827,226 (50%) of the liability claims paid by the city.
OMB Study, supra note 20. Regulation would probably be less effective in cases involving police
action or medical malpractice. However, even those two classes of torts might be reduced with proper
procedural safeguards, such as preventing police from using the choke hold.
Since the regulatory plan is composed of multiple policy variables- direct regulation, and fines and
administrative orders-each of which helps to effectuate the desired level of deterrence, costs can be
controlled. To the extent that direct regulation is too costly to administer, fines can be emphasized.
Again, this alternative gives state legislatures the flexibility to tailor a plan suitable to their needs.
The New Zealand plan also provides a framework for structuring the preferred system. In New
Zealand, the Department of Labour sends inspectors out to investigate regulatory violations in the
workplace and disseminate safety information. The proposal in this Note sets up a similar type of
monitoring system. The New Zealand plan, however, is not wholly effective for three reasons: (1)
investigations are not focused on the need for structural changes in workplace design; (2) effective
sanctions (fines) are not available for enforcement; and (3) political pressure is not created, since
reports are not systematically revealed to labor groups. T. ISON, supra note 43, at 159-62. State
legislators should avoid such omissions when they draft laws to implement state-funded municipal
liability programs.
60. See Wittman, supra note 57, at 203 (punishment (fines) for ex ante behavior can alleviate
"moral hazard"). In addiion, fines are preferable to court judgments because they can be imposed
quickly and prospectively.
61. See supra note 48 (power of states over municipalities).
62. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 1, at A6, col. 1 (township of Schaghtiooke, N.Y., closed down
road because it could not afford to make it insurable).
63. State legislators could heighten deterrence either by increasing regulation, or raising penalties
associated with regulatory violations. These options allow legislators to structure a desirable system
and control costs.
New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act of 1972 contains provisions regarding fines and bonuses
similar to those proposed in this Note. 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409 (1975). Section 73 of the Act provides for
bonuses to be given to, or penalties to be levied against, employers in relation to their accident experi-
ence. If an employer has a lower accident rate than those in her category of employers, she may
receive a bonus. However, if the employer has a higher rate, she may be forced to pay a fine. Never-
theless, the New Zealand system is inadequate in three respects which state legislators implementing
this proposal should avoid: (1) records relating to accident experience are not kept; (2) standards for
group comparison are not maintained; and (3) standards for imposing fines are not available. T. ISON,
supra note 43, at 127-29, 173-75.
Despite its shortcomings, empirical evidence shows that the New Zealand Act has increased deter-
rence in at least one area-automobile safety. Since the start of the compensation system, the number
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The regulatory agency would compare the records of municipalities to
determine which cause accidents and commit regulatory violations dispro-
portionate, in number and severity, to other municipalities. The informa-
tion on regulatory violations should be gathered by state safety inspectors,
who could be part of the agency established to implement regulations. An
inspection regime could be designed along the lines of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's ("OSHA") inspection policy.
OSHA is authorized to make unscheduled inspections." OSHA ranks
inspections in the following order of importance: (1) imminent danger sit-
uations, (2) catastrophic and fatality situations, (3) complaint investiga-
tions, (4) Target Industry Program and Target Health Program inspec-
tions, and (5) random inspections.6 5 A state regulatory agency might
follow a similar ranking system, perhaps along the following lines: (1)
circumstances involving imminent harm to citizens, (2) systematic viola-
tion of regulations or consistently poor experience ratings, and (3) random
inspections. Violators should be subjected to follow-up inspections, such as
those conducted by OSHA. 6 Inspectors should be guided in their choice
of inspection sites by information on which municipalities had the most
frequent and severe liability damages awarded against them, and which
municipalities consistently or egregiously violated regulations. In addition,
random (unannounced) inspections should be undertaken.67 Data on the
frequency and severity of tort damages awarded against municipalities
should be readily available from records of claims paid out by the state.
The state could use the information gathered to compile a list of the
most dangerous municipalities. 8 At the municipal level, the party out of
power could capitalize on the fact that the municipality has been identi-
fied as dangerous. This signal would imply that those in power were inca-
and severity (measured in fatalities per vehicle kilometer travelled) of automobile accidents has dimin-
ished. The initiation of the New Zealand plan was coupled with increased regulation over driving
activity and more efficient monitoring. Brown, supra note 53, at 1000-02.
64. 29 U.S.C. §666(f) (1982). See also B. WALLS, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
77 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 84, 1972) (general discussion of
OSHA inspection procedures).
65. Id. at 29.
66. See id. at 85-87.
67. The Supreme Court has held that "closely regulated" commercial industries may be subject to
warrantless searches by states. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). It follows that a munici-
pality, although not a "closely regulated" commercial industry, also would not be protected from
random inspections by the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Cf. supra note 48 (discussing state regulatory authority over municipalities).
In New Zealand, inspectors from the Department of Labour investigate accidents. T. IsoN, supra
note 43, at 159. Under California's LASIA program, discussed supra note 3, auditors will monitor
safety projects to ensure that municipal safety programs meet state risk management standards. How-
ever, the California plan will not prescribe on-site inspections. Wasser Interview, supra note 2. These
two regulatory systems demonstrate the flexibility available to legislatures in implementing the specif-
ics of this proposal: A legislature may choose an on-site system of inspection or a more indirect means
of evaluating safety plans.
68. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 117-19 (1979) (examining correlation between voter in-
formation and representative behavior).
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pable of ensuring safety and were wasting the voters' money on fines.
Because a neutral state agency would compile the data on safety and fines,
the political signal would be more legitimate than a compilation by the
very officials under attack; furthermore, the information would be more
complete than if it had been disseminated by courts.69
Legislatures could utilize the monies garnered through fines in several
ways. First, the monies could be used to reward municipalities judged by
the regulatory agency to exhibit exemplary safety records. This practice
would reward municipal governments and their constituencies. Second,
the monies could be placed in the general insurance pool to provide com-
pensation for injured victims. Finally, the monies could pay for safety pro-
grams, thereby increasing the overall safety level within the state.
3. Safety Education
Safety education should play an important role in state regulation.
Many of the harms at the municipal level are caused by low-level employ-
ees who may not know of, or fully appreciate, existing safety programs
and regulations. 0 To rectify this situation, the state should send teams of
safety educators across the state to instruct workers on safety.71 Education
programs could range from advising road workers on how to prevent
hazards to teaching park officials proper methods of supervising organized
sports activities.7 2 The safety education program would be largely self-
perpetuating, since each "generation" of employees, once trained in safety
69. An accident level dissemination system would provide a greater political deterrent than court
judgments since court judgments do not usually gain wide publicity unless they are extremely large or
controversial.
70. See P. ScHucK, supra note 18, at 101-05 (task structure may constrain low-level worker from
altering potentially tortious behavior); James, supra note 11, at 557-63. James believes that employ-
ees have an incentive to avoid accidents, apart from those brought about by possible liability: Employ-
ees risk personal injury or employer discipline for a job poorly done. James stresses that, even with
insurance coverage, the "moral hazard" does not prevail for those reasons and also because large
insurers have safety programs. See also Sandoz, supra note 20, at 444 (safe operations depend on
conscientious employees with adequate training); Schirmer, Why Safety?, 8 CURRENT MUN. PROBS.
347, 349 (1981) (one "personal factor" of accidents is lack of instruction for low-level employees on
proper procedures). Of course, safety education alone, without the other components of this proposal,
would be insufficient to achieve the desired level of deterrence. Cf McCaffrey, Decentralizing Occu-
pational Health and Safety Regulation: An Evaluation of the Foundation and Prospects, 21 CAL
W.L. REv. 101, 125-27 (1984) (quest to reorient safety attitudes not sufficient to reduce risk in
manufacturing).
71. Safety education programs currently occupy the policy agenda of municipalities and are
viewed as necessary components of safety programs. Barr & Rosenthal, A Risk Management Ap-
proach for Small and Intermediate Cities, 11 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 45, 47 (1984-85) (need for
safety booklet for employees); Sandoz, supra note 20, at 447 (one method of accident prevention is
education of municipal workforce on vastness of liability problem); Ward, Accident Prevention for
New Employees, 9 CURRENT MUN. PROBS. 451 (1982-83) (need to provide orientation program for
new employees) see also Kanawaty, Training for a Changing World: Some General Reflections, 124
IN'L LAB. REv. 401, 407 (1985) (need for training within workplace).
72. In New Zealand, the program attempts to create an interest in safety by disseminating infor-
mation and conducting safety campaigns. ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 56, at 114; T. IsoN, supra
note 43, at 159.
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skills, could in turn train incoming workers. Therefore, safety education
may well turn out to be substantially a one-time investment.
Regulation is a direct (result-oriented) means of preventing undesirable
behavior. A system of regulation that would address the need to control
municipalities, which might otherwise seek to abuse a state-funded insur-
ance program, would effectively guard against excessive tortious behavior;
therefore, deterrence would be assured.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSAL
This Section explores consequences of the proposal not previously ex-
amined so that legislators can make a fully informed decision whether,
and in what form, to adopt these recommendations.
A. Advantages
In addition to furthering the goal of loss spreading and maintaining the
goals of deterrence and compensation, the state-funded system has other
advantages. State funding would increase compensation, ensure implemen-
tation of adequate safety programs, provide a long-term solution to the
problem of insurance unavailability, and contribute to rational formula-
tion of tort policy.
Shifting liability to the state level would increase compensation because
state funds would be available even if the municipal tortfeasor were un-
derinsured." A state-funded insurance system would be an improvement
over the current system, under which some poorer municipalities may be
judgment-proof against large claims due to a limited revenue base and an
inability to insure effectively. 4 The size of a state's tax base permits it to
self-insure more easily than municipalities can.
The proposed system would ensure that even the smallest city would
have a risk control program. Currently, many small cities cannot afford
risk control programs and consequently face the danger of a higher acci-
dent rate, as well as exposure to liability suits. 5 States have more re-
sources to channel into safety education and inspection programs than do
73. See generally supra note 2 (plight of uninsured cities). Insufficient insurance is a concern
because large awards may bankrupt municipalities with small budgets-for instance, Schaghticoke,
N.Y. See Sawyer, supra note 1, at A6, col. 6 (3800,000 town budget).
74. The shift of funding to the state level, in conjunction with state regulatory measures, may
lower the risk level of municipal activities. For underinsured municipalities, market deterrence will
not produce the desired result because the full cost of accidents cannot be internalized; only the
amount equivalent to assets may be internalized. This means that if a municipality obtains insurance
for $1 million of liability, and its ability to pay damages for torts is limited by financial constraints, it
will take precautions that prevent only the first $1 million in damages. Therefore, if the desired level
of deterrence exceeds $1 million, the municipality is not undertaking enough deterrence-related activ-
ity. S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 279-80 (1987); Wittman, supra note 57,
at 204.
75. Pribble, supra note 54, at 364 (small cities rarely able to afford risk management programs).
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individual municipalities. In addition, centralization under the control of
the state would make these programs more cost-effective. 6
Finally, a state-funded insurance regime would protect municipal gov-
ernments from the vagaries of insurance business cycles."
B. Possible Disadvantages
This proposal calls for an increase in government spending on safety
and regulatory programs. The increased costs are associated with forming
and funding an agency to regulate safety. Nevertheless, these costs are
justifiable because they further the goals of tort law. Increased spending
on safety may be called for, regardless of state assumption of liability,
because of the benefits that accrue to municipalities and their citizens from
risk management. 8 In addition, any increase in revenues needed to fund
the program should be partially offset by a corresponding decrease in
property taxes.
Legislatures may be tempted to change tort laws to limit municipal lia-
bility. However, changes in tort laws are not necessarily detrimental.7 9
Moreover, once state legislatures have evaluated this proposal on its mer-
its and recognized its advantages, it would be inconsistent for them to
change laws solely to decrease compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
In looking for answers to the problems of municipal tort liability and
the lack of available insurance, state legislatures are searching for solu-
tions without thoroughly considering the goals underlying tort law.80 Leg-
islatures should respond to these issues in a manner that is fundamentally
sound in terms of meeting the goals of the tort law system. State assump-
tion of responsibility for municipal tort funding through non-regressive
state income tax revenues would allow legislatures to further the goal of
loss spreading without compromising existing levels of compensation and
deterrence. This end could be accomplished within a framework that al-
lows each legislature to tailor a program to the needs of its own state. In
addition, the proposal provides a long-term solution to current and future
76. The state should be even more effective at analyzing such data due to economies of scale and
institutional advantages. See C. HEIMER, supra note 57, at 206 (sometimes cheaper to collectivize
safety programs).
77. See generally supra note 2 (some municipalities forced to go without insurance).
78. See supra Section III(B)(3) (need to increase safety education programs).
79. If full internalization of tort costs leads legislatures to revise tort rules, the new system of rules
would be more efficient than the earlier system because the rules would be based on more precise
information.
In the past, states have not resisted possible tort liability. As of 1978, 44 states and the District of
Columbia had abolished sovereign immunity either judicially or statutorily in whole or in part. Bir-
mingham, supra note 14, at 295; see also E. MCQUItuN & S. FLANAGAN, supra note 14, § 53.02
(discussing judicial and legislative abrogation of sovereign immunity).
80. See supra note 3.
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insurance crises by shielding municipalities from the gyrations of commer-
cial insurance availability.

